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CoNsTITUTIONAL LAw-lliGHT TO EFFECTIVB Ass1STANCE oF CoUNsEL IN 
FEDERAL CotmTS AND WAIVER THEREoF-Indicted for illegal traffic in narcotics, 
petitioner and his trial counsel allegedly attempted to fabricate an alibi on the 
false testimony of petitioner's girl friend. The evidence indicated that on sev-
eral occasions before trial, the girl was invited to the office of petitioner's attorney, 
given narcotics, and told to memorize certain false testimony to be used in peti-
tioner's defense. Later the girl bad a change of mind and agreed to testify for 
the government Despite the strenuous objections of defendant's counsel, a 
description of this alleged fraud on the court was given in the prosecution's 
opening statement, and the witness was permitted to testify. The defense 
attorney refused the court's offer of additional counsel and proceeded to conduct 
the defense alone. Petitioner was convicted as charged in the indictment, where-
upon, with the aid of new counsel appointed by the court, be filed a motion to 
vacate judgment There was no· question on the admissibility of testimony 
showing the attempted fabrication of evidence. Yet the petitioner contended 
that this evidence so discredited his attorney in the eyes of the jury that be did 
not have the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments; therefore the court should have either advised him of bis con-
stitutional rights or, acting sua sponte, appointed other counsel in his behalf. 
The lower court rejected this line of argument On appeal, held, affirmed with 
one judge dissenting. The majority found that even if petitioner was preju-
diced, be was in no position to say that the court should have rescued him from 
his own wrongdoing. Harvey v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1954) 215 F. (2d) 
330. 
The right to the assistance of counsel guaranteed in the federal courts by 
the express provision of the Sixth Amendment and the due process clause of 
the Fifth Amendment extends far beyond the simple appointment of an attor-
ney for the accused.1 This is an absolute substantive right, which, when vio-
l For a discussion of the subject in general, see Fellman, "The Constitutional Right 
to Counsel in Federal Courts," 30 NEB. L. REv. 559 (1951); Holtzoff, "The Right of 
Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment," 20 N.Y. Umv. L.Q. REv. 1 (1944). 
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lated, goes to the jurisdiction of the court.2 To protect defendant's right, there-
fore, the assistance of counsel must be "effective,''3 which implies that counsel 
should be competent. 4 Though the courts are reluctant to recognize a denial 
of any constitutional right when the counsel has simply made a mistake at 
trial5 or misadvised his client, 6 the incompetence involved in the principal case 
presents a more serious problem. Clearly the jury would be prejudiced against 
petitioner's counsel by the evidence that he participated in an attempted fraud 
upon the court. This could not but reflect on the counsel's veracity and such 
prejudice could hardly be wiped from the minds of the jury by instructions 
from the court. Though counsel may have been competent in every other 
respect, one doubts whether his representation was effective in presenting peti-
tioner's defense before an impartial jury. Even the majority opinion does not 
categorically deny this lack of effectiveness, but rests instead on a principle of 
waiver or estoppel. The court's theory was that petitioner could not ask the 
court to protect his right to effective counsel because he had chosen his own 
counsel, had continued with him throughout the trial without objection, and 
had himself participated in the attempted fraud on the court. But does the fact 
that petitioner selected counsel for himself necessarily amount to a waiver? In 
Diggs v. Welch7 it was held that once defendant had secured competent coun-
sel, in that case by appointment of the court, his rights under the Sixth Amend-
ment were satisfied. The opinion went on to say, however, that in an extreme 
case of incompetency defendant could still rely on his right to a fair trial under 
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The same principle might 
properly apply when counsel is selected· by the defendant. Nor is it clear that 
petitioner effectively waived his rights by raising no objection during the trial. 
A proper waiver must be intelligently and competently made,8 which means 
that the petitioner must at least understand what his rights are. 9 Admittedly, 
2 Johnson v. Zerhst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (1938). This case, the leading one 
in the field, held that it is the duty of the trial court to protect and advise the accused of 
his right to counsel; that if the accused is unable to secure counsel for financial or other 
reasons, the court must appoint counsel for him; and that, absent an intelligent and com-
petent waiver, a violation of this right will sustain a release of the convicted party by writ 
of habeas corpus. 
3 Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457 (1942) (effective assistance 
of counsel was found lacking when one attorney was appointed for two defendants with 
confficting interests); United States v. Bergamo, (3d Cir. 1946) 154 F. (2d) 31 (counsel 
was denied sufficient time to prepare for trial); and United States v. Venuto, (3d Cir. 
1950) 182 F. (2d) 519 (defendant was prohibited from consulting in privacy with his 
counsel during an 18-hour court recess). 
4Achtien v. Dowd, (7th Cir. 1941) 117 F. (2d) 989. 
5 Diggs v. Welch, (D.C. Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 667, cert. den. 325 U.S. 889, 65 
S.Ct. 1576 (1945). 
6 Helms v. Humphrey, (D.C. Minn. 1945) 63 F. Supp. 4. 
7 Note 5 supra. 
8 Johnson v. Zerbst, note 2 supra. 
9 Knowledge is a material element of waiver, and therefore without being informed 
of his right, defendant could not be deemed to have waived it. Wood v. United States, 
(D.C. Cir. 1942) 128 F. (2d) 265. 
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where the accused has competent counsel, he may be deemed to have been 
advised of his rights and a failure to object would serve as a waiver. However, 
it is hardly fair to assume that the accused in the principal case was advised 0£ 
the invasion of his rights when that invasion is counsel's own incompetence. 
Finally, can petitioner be estopped from asking the assistance of the court in 
appointing new counsel because he participated in the fraudulent scheme'i 
There is no indication in the opinion that the alleged fraud was established 
by the jury in a special verdict or admitted by petitioner.10 If the fraud was 
not proved, it is inconceivable that petitioner should be precluded from assert-
ing a constitutional right by the mere allegation and evidence of the prosecu-
tion. But even if this question had been decided against the petitioner or 
admitted, it would only constitute a separate crime of subornation of perjury 
and should not preclude petitioner's right to a fair and impartial trial on the 
indictment at hand.11 The strength of the majority position therefore is by no 
means as self evident as the brevity of the opinion would suggest. As the prin-
ciples of waiver which the court has so conveniently assumed are examined more 
thoroughly, there is considerable question whether petitioner has received the 
full protection 0£ the court to which he is entitled under the Constitution. 
Richm;d M. Adams, S.Ed. 
10 The alleged fraud was not an issue in the trial, but was only offered as evidence 
of petitioner's guilt on the indictment of illegal traffic in narcotics. Absent a special verdict, 
a finding of guilty on the indictment would not prove that petitioner was also guilty of the 
fraud charge. Nor had petitioner admitted the fact, for, according to the opinion, he denied 
practically everything that the witness said. Principal case at 331, note 2. 
11 Braswell v. United States, (5th Cir. 1952) 200 F. (2d) 597. Where defendant 
had assaulted the prosecuting attorney during trial and was charged with contempt, the 
court found that defendant should not be denied his right to request a new trial because 
o£ prejudice resulting from this assault and other acts of misconduct by codefendants. 
